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BENIGN LANGUAGE ON LETTERS FROM DEBT COLLECTORS
AND AVOIDING VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT
Sebastian West

I. INTRODUCTION
People may expect solicitations or prank calls from unknown callers,
not threats of legal action. But this happened to Jessica Burke after she
fell behind on her car payments and asked the financing company for
more time to pay back her loan.1 Ms. Burke’s experience was not unique;
other consumers receive calls from people threatening to place liens on
their homes,2 sue their children,3 or dig up dead bodies.4 These phone calls
occur thousands of times a year5 and are just one example of abusive
practices used by debt collectors.6 Fortunately, consumers can seek
protection from abusive debt collectors under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”).7
As part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, Congress created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to collect, investigate, and respond to
consumer complaints and bring suit for violations of the FDCPA.8 In 2020
alone, the CFPB collected approximately 82,700 complaints reported by
consumers for deceptive, abusive, and unfair debt collection services—
the second largest category of complaints reported.9 The majority of the
complaints arose from debt collectors trying to collect debts consumers
reported were not owed.10 Conversely, consumers also filed complaints
1. Allie Johnson, True Debt Collection Horror Stories, FOX BUSINESS NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/true-debt-collection-horror-tales. The caller was not an attorney,
but a debt collector alleging to be one.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Blake Ellis, Debt Collection Horror Stories, CNN MONEY (Feb. 6, 2013, 10:53AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2013/02/06/pf/debt-collection/index.html.
5. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
ACT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2021, 18-20 (March 2021) (depicting in Table 1 that 8% of the 82,700 debt
collection complaints received in 2020 related to communication tactics over the phone) [hereinafter
BUREAU: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT].
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2) & (5) (explaining debt collectors violation the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act if they use obscene or profane language or cause the telephone to ring or engage any person
in conversation with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass).
7. 15 U.S.C § 1692 et seq.
8. BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT, 4
(Jan. 1 – Dec. 31, 2020) [hereinafter BUREAU: CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT].
9. Id. at 9. The highest category of complaints is credit or consumer reporting.
10. See BUREAU: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at Table 1 (49% of 82,700 complaints
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alleging debt collectors sent abusive notifications, threatened to take
negative or legal action, made false statements or representations,
practiced abusive communication tactics, and threatened to contact others
or share information improperly.11 Notwithstanding whether debt is
owed, many consumers have experienced the oppressive behavior of debt
collectors hounding for payment.
Debt collection is a large industry. As of 2019, the CFPB reported
third-party debt collection was a $12.7 billion industry, employing nearly
141,000 people across approximately 6,950 collection agencies in the
United States.12 These debt collectors attempt to collect debt owed for
auto loans, credit cards, federal student loans, medical bills, and more.13
Regardless of the debt source, debt collectors must comply with the
FDCPA in their communications with consumers.
This Comment explores a circuit split on how debt collectors comply
with 15 U.S.C. §1692f(8), under which debt collectors are only allowed
to include limited language and symbols on envelopes and other written
communications to consumers.14 The permissible language and symbols
include the debt collector’s address, business name so long as the name
does not indicate that it is a debt collecting business, and the consumer’s
address.15 Because written notification about debt accounted for twenty
percent of all the debt collection complaints in 2020,16 compliance with
§1692f is important for debt collectors to avoid getting sued. Although
the Seventh Circuit held in Preston v. Midland Credit Management that
there were no exceptions to §1692f(8)’s requirements,17 both the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits had previously recognized a benign language exception
when debt collectors included language on envelopes such as “priority
letter,” “personal,” and “confidential.”
Part II of this Comment provides background on the FDCPA and
discusses activities by debt collectors that constitute violations of the
FDCPA. Part II also summarizes the federal district court cases which
first adopted the benign language exception under §1692f(8), the Fifth
and Eighth Circuit decisions which upheld the benign language exception
under §1692f(8), and the Seventh Circuit’s decision which rejected that
related to attempts collect debts not owed).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 13.
13. See BUREAU: CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 28. In 2020, other
debt and credit card debt were the most complained about debt type.
14. See infra note 44.
15. See Donovan v. Firstcredit, Inc., 983 F.3d 246, 254-55 (6th Cir. 2021) (finding those
requirements necessary for delivery of the communication).
16. See BUREAU: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at Table 1.
17. 948 F.3d 772, 781 (7th Cir. 2020) (reading the statute on its face and ruling any other language
or symbol expressly provided is a violation).
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exception. Part III lastly argues that the Seventh Circuit took the correct
approach. Finally, Part IV recommends ways to provide more clarity to
debt collectors regarding what constitutes a violation of §1692f(8) when
communicating with consumers.
II. BACKGROUND
The FDCPA provides consumers relief from abusive debt collection
practices and ensures debt collectors refrain from using abusive debt
collection methods.18 Before its passage, Congress recognized that
consumers facing abusive collection practices lacked adequate legal
protection.19 Congress accordingly enacted laws imposing liability on
debt collectors who violate consumers’ rights.20 First, Part A of this
Section provides a brief history of the FDCPA and discusses the statutory
framework of the FDCPA. Part B summarizes the federal district court
decisions that led to the present circuit split between the Fifth, Eighth, and
Seventh Circuits regarding a benign language exception to unfair and
unconscionable debt collection practices. Finally, Part C explains how
each circuit decided to either adopt or reject the exception.
A. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA21 in response to the debt
collection industry’s perceived abusive debt collection practices.22
Generally, consumers experienced two common forms of abuse:
threatening late-night phone calls and disclosure of personal information
to third parties.23 The FDCPA was therefore “designed to protect
consumers who have been victimized by unscrupulous debt collectors,
regardless of whether a valid debt actually exists.”24 Congress reasoned,
regardless of an individual’s level of debt, the FDCPA would ensure the
“right to be treated in a reasonable and civil manner.”25 To allow debt
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
19. Id. at § 1692(b).
20. Id. at § § 1692c, 1692d, and 1692k.
21. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977), codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2020).
22. Matthew S. Robertson, Of Language and Symbols: A Move Toward Defining What is
"Benign" Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act [Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d
299 (3d Cir. 2014)], 54 WASHBURN L.J. 761 (2015).
23. Elwin Griffith, The Peculiarity of Language in the Debt Collection Process: The Impact of
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 673, 674 (Summer 2008).
24. Baker v. G. C. Services Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing 1977 U.S. Code Cong.
& Adm. News, 1695, 1696).
25. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, 760 F.2d 1168, 1178 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing 123 CONG. REC. H10,241
(daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977)(statement of Rep. Annunzio); 123 CONG REC H10,10138, at *H10,241 (LEXIS).
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collectors to engage in otherwise abusive practices would certainly
contribute to invasions of individual privacy.26 Thus, the FDCPA added
several more protections for consumers in addition to the two alreadyexisting consumer rights laws: the Consumer Credit Protection Act27 and
Fair Credit Reporting Act.28
To provide the widest protection for consumers, the FDCPA defines a
consumer as “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay
any debt.”29 Similarly broad, a debt collector is defined as “any person
who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.”30
The FDCPA governs communications between consumers and debt
collectors31 and prohibits debt collectors from engaging in any conduct to
“harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of
a debt.”32 Other violations include the use of false, deceptive or
misleading representations to consumers33 and unfair or unconscionable
collection practices.34
To ensure compliance with the FDCPA, Congress enabled the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) to authorize faithful enforcement of the
FDCPA.35 Congress empowered the FTC to investigate alleged violations
of the FDCPA and bring suit against debt collectors to redress consumers’
claims. When alleged violations occur, consumers are advised to contact
the FTC or the CFPB36 or independently bring a lawsuit against the debt
collector, to determine a possible remedy. Generally interpreted as a strict
liability statute,37 if the consumer proves any violation, she is entitled to
actual damages and up to $1,000 in statutory damages as determined by
26. See § 1692(a) (reading “there is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair
debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the
number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual
privacy”).
27. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat 163 (1968), codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq. (2021).
28. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat 1128 (1970), codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2021).
29. 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3).
30. Id. at § 1692a(6).
31. Id. at § 1692c.
32. Id. at § 1692d.
33. Id. at § 1692e.
34. Id. at § 1692f.
35. Id. at § 1692l(a).
36. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
Consumer
Information:
Debt
Collection
FAQs,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/debt-collection-faqs (last visited Sept. 14, 2021).
37. See e.g., Beuter v. Canyon State Prof’l Servs., 261 Fed. Appx. 14, 15 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
the FDCPA imposes strict liability on debt collectors); Som v. Daniels Law Offices, P.C., 573 F. Supp.
2d 349, 356 (D. Mass. 2008); McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenberg & Lauinger, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1247,
1257 (D. Mont. 2009); Owen v. I.C. Sys., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2011).
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the court.38 Nevertheless, the statute provides two safe harbor provisions
removing liability.39 First, the debt collector can avoid liability by
showing “the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide
error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted
to avoid any such error.”40 Second, the debt collector shall not have any
liability to “any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any
advisory opinion of the [CFPB].”41
When consumers bring violations under §1692e for false or misleading
representations, they usually bring additional claims under §1692f for
unfair and unconscionable practices. Section 1692f covers not only unfair
or unconscionable practices but also lists eight other distinct practices that
constitute violations.42 A few of these practices include: (1) collecting any
amount not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt, (2)
accepting a check postdated more than five days unless the consumer is
notified in writing that the debt collector will be depositing the check, (3)
soliciting by a debt collector of any postdated check for the purpose of
threatening or instituting a criminal prosecution, and (4) communicating
with a consumer regarding a debt by post card.43 Nevertheless, a
consumer often alleges a debt collector violated §1692f(8) because the
collector included prohibited language on the letter to the consumer. A
debt collector violates Section 1692f(8) by:
[u]sing any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on
any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or
by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such
name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.44

That provision appears absolute in its language; however, several courts
have allowed debt collectors a benign language exception, permitting debt
collectors to add innocuous language such as “priority mail.”45 Part B will
now examine the federal district court decisions that first recognized a
benign language exception.

38. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).
39. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 578, 130 S. Ct.
1605 (2010) (providing exceptions to FDCPA violations including § 1692k(c) and § 1692k(e)).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
41. Id. at § 1692k(e). The provision continues to say “notwithstanding that after such act or
omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority
to be invalid for any reason.” Id. Here, the advisory opinion seeks to provide some protection for the debt
collector who asks the CFPB for review and approval of the debt collecting methods before using them
on consumers.
42. See generally § 1692f(1)-(8).
43. Id. The examples provided above were abbreviated version of § 1692f(1)-(3), (7). Please see
§ 1692f for all 8 practices of violative conduct.
44. Id. § 1692f(8).
45. See infra, Part II, Section B.
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B. Federal District Court Decisions
In Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., the United States District Court
for the Central District of California held when a debt collector prints
“PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL” and “Forwarding and Address
Correction Requested” on an envelope, §1692f(8) is not violated because
the language is benign.46 The plaintiff brought several FDCPA claims
against the debt collector, but the court denied summary judgment on the
alleged violation of §1692f(8).47 The court acknowledged in some cases
“a strict interpretation of the FDCPA may be necessary to protect
consumer privacy and prevent embarrassment to consumers.”48 However,
the court reasoned Congress’s interest in protecting consumers is not
furthered by benign language printed on letters to consumers.49 The
statute was designed to prevent debt collectors from using symbols on
envelopes that indicated debt collection,50 and the court held there was no
such violation on the defendant’s letter.
In Johnson v. NCB Collection Services, the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut ruled debt collectors did not violate
§1692f(8) when they innocuously printed “Revenue Department” on the
return address.51 The debt collector included “Revenue Department” on
its return address as a department designation and to distinguish its
collection letter from other junk mail.52 The court reasoned this
designation was similar to “other permissible forms of correspondence
such as direct billings from creditors for debts not yet past due.” 53 Citing
46. 759 F. Supp. 1456, 1466 (C.D. Ca. 1991) (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
because of a benign language exception to § 1692f(8)).
47. Id. To reach its conclusion, the court analogized the plaintiff’s alleged violation to the
violation brought in Rutyna v. Collection Accounts Terminal, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 980 (N.D. Ill. 1979). In
Rutyna, the court held the debt collector violated § 1692f(8) because the debt collector’s return address—
COLLECTION ACCOUNTS TERMINAL, INC.—indicated the debt collector was in the debt collection
business. Id. at 982. The Rutyna court held the violation would cause consumers the type of
embarrassment § 1692f(8) was specifically drafted to prevent. Id. Thus, in Masuda, the court held
including “PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL” and “Forward Address Correction Requested” on an
envelope would not raise the same embarrassment concerns for the plaintiff. 759 F. Supp at 1466.
48. Masuda, 759 F. Supp. at 1466. It would be reasonable to believe then the court acknowledged
these phrases violated § 1692f(8).
49. Id. It should be noted the court failed to provide other examples of benign language, which do
not violate § 1692f(8).
50. Id.
51. 799 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (D. Conn. 1992) (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
because “Revenue Department” was an innocuous designation of debt collector’s address).
52. Id. Although not raised by the plaintiff as another alleged § 1692f(8) violation, nor addressed
by the court in its opinion, the debt collector also included “Personal and Confidential” in large, boldfaced,
and underlined capital letters on the envelope’s exterior. Id. at 1301.
53. Id. at 1305. Here the court postulates the “Revenue Department” might suggest a credit-related
transaction is involved, but it concluded that nothing in that language would suggest the letter came from
an entity in the debt collection business. The court reasoned the letter could have been sent from a creditor

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss3/7

6

West: Benign Language on Letters from Debt Collectors and Avoiding Viol

976

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

Masuda for support, the court held mere use of the innocuous designation
was not the type of abusive collection practices the FDCPA was drafted
to prohibit.54
In Lindbergh v. Transworld Systems, the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut held the use of the word
“TRANSMITTAL” printed across a bold blue stripe did not violate
§1692f(8).55 The plaintiff alleged the debt collector’s use of “transmittal”
over a bold blue stripe constituted a symbol, indicating the debt collector
was in the business of collecting debts.56 The court summarily dismissed
this argument because there was no supporting case law and Congress
drafted §1692f(8) to prevent debt collectors from indicating their business
was a debt collecting business through language and symbols, which the
bold blue stripe did not implicate.57 Additionally, the court relied on both
the Masuda opinion and the FTC’s commentary that §1692f(8) was
designed to prohibit symbols and language revealing the debt collector’s
true business—not to “totally bar the use of harmless words or symbols
on an envelope.”58 Thus, the court held the plaintiff’s mechanical
interpretation of §1692f(8) was not supported by case law, legislative
history, or the governing administrative agency.59
With three opinions favoring the benign language exception, future
courts would have guidance for adjudicating violations of §1692f(8). If a
plaintiff sought to prove a violation, she would have to show the language
on the debt collector’s envelope was not benign but caused
embarrassment and invaded one’s privacy.60 When the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits addressed this issue a decade later, they agreed with those district
court opinions; however, the Seventh Circuit held the provision
unambiguously afforded no exception for benign language. Part C will
now discuss the circuit split between the Seventh Circuit and the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits.

attempting to collect debts from the debtor, which is expressly allowed by § 1692a(6). Id.
54. Id.
55. 846 F. Supp. 175, 180 (D. Conn. 1994) (denying granting defendant’s cross-motion for
summary judgment because the use of “TRANSMITTAL” over a blue stripe was not a symbol § 1692f(8)
was designed to prevent). Because Johnson and Lindbergh were decided by the same judge, Chief Judge
Jose A. Cabranes, one can only speculate what the outcome might have been if another judge adjudicated
Lindbergh.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. (quoting the FTC Official Staff commentary on the FDCPA. See 53 Fed. Reg. 50097,
50099 (Dec. 13, 1988)).
59. Id. Important to note the court implicitly appears to take the position there is a benign symbol
exception, or that the court glossed over the fact “TRANSMITTAL” would fall into the benign language
exception.
60. A core concern for the FDCPA. See § 1692(a).
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C. The Circuit Split
Before the Seventh Circuit broke away from its sister circuits, the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits provided the leading opinions for furthering the
benign language exception among the district courts.61 Although the Fifth
Circuit gave more precedential weight to the exception first argued in
Masuda, the court changed the analysis for its justification by looking to
legislative intent to remove the ambiguity in §1692f(8).62 This Section
discusses the split between the circuits. First, this Section explains how
the benign language exception was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Goswami v. American Collections Enterprises and the Eighth Circuit in
Strand v. Diversified Collection Services. Then, it examines the Seventh
Circuit’s rejection of the exception in Preston v. Midland Credit
Management.
1. The Fifth Circuit’s benign language exception in Goswami
The Fifth Circuit ruled the inclusion of “priority letter” on an
envelope’s exterior failed to be anything more than benign language.63 In
Goswami, the plaintiff received a second letter bearing an inch-thick blue
bar across the entire envelope and containing the words “priority letter”
in white ink.64 The debt collector even admitted the letter was designed to
entice debtors to open the letters, but the benign language exception
applied because the letter was not deceitful or indicative of the debt
collector’s business.65 Ultimately affirming the district court’s approval
of the argument, the Fifth Circuit first decided §1692f(8) was ambiguous
and allowed for a review of the legislative history to resolve the

61. See e.g. Voris v. Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2007)
(acknowledging a benign language exception but wanting to expand its use from the Goswami and Strand
decisions); Waldron v. Prof’l Med. Mgmt., No. 12-1863, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34402, at *8 (E.D. Penn.
March 13, 2013) (adopting the benign language exception); Gonzalez v. FMS, Inc., No. 14 C 9424, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87660, at *13 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2015); Davis v. MRS BPO, LLC, No. 15 C 2303, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91726, at *15 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2015); Anenkova v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 201 F. Supp.
3d 631, 636 (E.D. Penn. 2016); but cf. Schmid v. Transworld Sys., No. 15 C 02212, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 118708, at **11-14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2015) (discussing the benign language exception).
62. See Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., 377 F.3d 488, 493-94 (5th Cir. 2004) (reasoning
when § 1692f(8) is read together with § 1692f, the provision takes on another reasonable meaning and
permits courts to look to the statute’s legislative history to resolve the ambiguity).
63. See id. at 491 (affirming the district court’s granting of defendant’s motion for summary
judgment for the alleged § 1692f(8) violation but reversing and remanding plaintiff’s other claim for the
defendant’s violation of § 1692e(10)).
64. See id. (providing the debt collector sent a letter more than 180 days prior but never received
a response).
65. Id. at 492 (summarizing the debt collector’s successful argument for its summary judgment
motion).
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ambiguity.66
The court reasoned FTC commentary clearly allowed for benign
language exceptions.67 The FTC stated a collector can communicate with
a consumer using a telegram or similar service, “that uses a Western
Union (or other provider) logo and the word ‘telegram’ (or similar word)
on the envelope, or a letter with the word ‘Personal’ or ‘Confidential’ on
the envelope.”68 The Fifth Circuit used the FTC’s commentary as direct
support for language such as “priority letter” and other benign language
appearing on debt collection letters.69 To further support its holding, the
court referred to a U.S. Senate report arguing so long as symbols on
envelopes do not indicate debt collection practices, there can be no
violation of the FDCPA.70 And while Masuda, Johnson, and Lindbergh
were used as support for the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the use of
“priority letter” was benign, the court did not mention those cases were
decided without finding statutory ambiguity.71 This was important
because the court could only look to legislative history if it concluded the
statute was ambiguous from its plain meaning.72
Conclusively, the court held unless the language would intimate debt
collection, innocuous language such as “priority letter” cannot violate
§1692f(8) and poses no threat or embarrassment to consumers.73
2. The Eighth Circuit’s benign language exception in Strand
The Eighth Circuit held interpreting §1692f(8) to exempt benign
language and symbols better effectuates Congressional purpose, and thus,
“PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL,” “IMMEDIATE REPLY
REQUESTED,” and even some neutral corporate initials are not
66. See id. at 492-93 (reasoning when § 1692f(8) is read in isolation, the language reasonably bars
any markings on the outside of debt collection letters other than the name and address of the parties;
however, when read together with the opening paragraph of § 1692f, the subsection is only to prohibit
unfair and unconscionable practices such as markings which signal the letter is indeed a debt collection
letter and tends to humiliate, threaten, or manipulate debtors. Because of these two reasonable
interpretations, the court looked to the legislative history to determine the purpose of the statute which
provides the most reasonable interpretation).
67. Id. at 494. In a footnote, the court provided the FTC commentary is persuasive because
commentary was “opened to public comment, was not a formal regulation, did not carry the force of law,
and did not undergo full agency consideration.” see id. at n.1.
68. See id. at 494 (quoting FTC Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53
Fed. Reg. 50097, 50108 (Dec. 13, 1988)).
69. Id. The court also noted harmless language could appear on envelopes.
70. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1702).
71. See id. (failing to acknowledge that those previous three cases were decided without requiring
resolution of ambiguous statutory language).
72. Id. at 492-93 (citing Hightower v. Texas Hosp. Ass’n., 65 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Only
if the language is unclear do we turn to legislative history.”)).
73. Id.
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violations of §1692f(8).74 In Strand, each of the four letters mailed to the
plaintiff bore the these terms and “D.C.S., Inc.” above the return
address.75 After dismissing the plaintiff’s claim,76 the Eighth Circuit
considered the plaintiff’s argument that if §1692f(8) is read strictly,
bizarre results would surface and exceed Congress’s unambiguous
intent.77 The court rejected this argument and reasoned there was
ambiguity in the provision.78
Unlike the Fifth Circuit’s finding of ambiguity in §1692f(8),79 the
Eighth Circuit determined the word “name” in §1692f(8) created
ambiguity and required an inquiry into the legislative history of the
statute.80 The issue being, whether “name” included a corporation’s
initials.81 The court determined the word “name” included both a
corporation’s initials and logos and did not “thwart Congressional
purpose [to prevent abusive collection practices] in any way.”82 The court
reasoned that proscribing such benign language would not further
congressional intent, and using corporate initials decreases the risk for
invading a consumer’s privacy.83 Furthermore, the court was persuaded
by the logic in Masuda and allowed the defendant’s other language to fall
into the benign language exception.84
In sum, the court ruled certain neutral logos and innocuous phrases like

74. Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., 380 F.3d 316, 317, 319 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming the
district courts granting of defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion because of the statute’s benign language
exception).
75. Id. at 317. “Immediately requested" was written in reverse typeface, which is defined as a
“light colored typeface printed or otherwise set against a dark background, like white text on a black
background.” The PAPER Mill Store, https://blog.thepapermillstore.com/design-techniques-reversedtype (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
76. See id. (providing the district court failed to strictly read § 1629f(8) and granting defendant’s
12(b)(6) motion because the benign language exception failed to provide relief to the alleged violation).
77. See id. at 318 (stating a literal interpretation of § 1692f(8) would not allow a debtor’s address
and pre-printed postage on an envelope. The court took the plaintiff’s argument further and determined a
literal reading would prohibit innocuous marks related to post like “overnight mail” and “forwarding and
address correction requested” even if used by the United States Postal Service).
78. Id.
79. See supra note 66.
80. See Strand, 380 F.3d at 318 (observing the statute does not definitely prohibit the use of initials
for a corporate name, which gives rise to an inquiry to determine if the word “name” in the statute
encompasses a reference to corporate initials. Because a corporation’s initials can have a broader
“currency” than just its name, there was sufficient doubt to the scope of the word “name” in § 1692f(8)).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 319 (relying on the same reasoning articulated in Masuda, which used the same
1977 Senate report stating § 1692f(8) prevents those symbols which indicate a debt collection business).
83. See id. (explaining abstract business names—such as initials—reveal less about the debt
collector’s business. Here D.C.S. is less revealing that printing the corporation’s actual name). The court
noted by applying a more liberal reading of the statute, it affords more advances to the statute’s purpose
and represents a more sensible statutory construction.
84. Id.
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“personal and confidential” and “immediate reply requested” would
render the alleged violative language benign.85 The Eighth Circuit held
those, and similar phrases, are benign because they fail to identify the
source or purpose of the debt collection letters individually or
collectively.86
3. The Seventh Circuit finds no benign language exception in Preston
Breaking from its sister circuits, the Seventh Circuit concluded the
prohibition under §1692f(8) is clear and unambiguous—any language or
symbol other than the debtor’s name and address is a violation.87 In
Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt., the plaintiff received an interior letter
bearing the words “TIME SENSITIVE DOCUMENT” visible through
the exterior letter’s glassine window.88 The plaintiff argued the statute
was unambiguous, and the blanket provision set forth in §1692f(8)
achieved, rather than frustrated, Congressional intent.89 The plaintiff
argued that by allowing benign language exceptions, debt collectors
would take “liberties” when sending their letters and avoid liability for
their violations because the additional language was “benign.”90 Although
the plaintiff lost at trial,91 the Seventh Circuit found the plaintiff’s claims
meritorious and criticized how the Fifth and Eighth Circuit reached their
holdings.92 Because the statutory language failed to lead to peculiar
results and afforded no ambiguity, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
resorting to legislative history was unnecessary and inappropriate.93
Beginning with its critique of the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit
determined adhering to the plain wording of §1692f(8) would not produce
bizarre results like prohibiting the debtor’s address or pre-printed postage
such as “overnight mail.”94 The Seventh Circuit noted §1692f(8)

85. Id.
86. See id. (denying plaintiff’s request for a triable issue on “benign language” because
defendant’s letters were benign as a matter of law).
87. Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 948 F.3d 772, 781 (7th Cir. 2020) (reading the statute on
its face and ruling any other language or symbol expressly provided is a violation).
88. Id. at 777.
89. See id. at 778.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 779 (summarizing the district court’s grant of defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion because
it held the Fifth and Eighth Circuit cases persuasive. The district court refused to apply a literal reading §
1692f(8), and it ruled Midland’s benign language of “time sensitive document” indistinguishable from
“priority letter” and “immediate reply requested,” which both satisfied the benign language exception).
92. Id. at 781-82.
93. Id. at 782-83. For support of its conclusion, the court cites United States v. Silva, 140 F.3d
1098 (7th Cir. 1998). "If the language is unambiguous, we need not resort to legislative history or other
sources to glean the legislative intent of the statute." 140 F.3d at 1102.
94. See Preston, 948 F.3d at 782. (disagreeing with the Strand court’s argument of bizarre results
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explicitly provides the words “use of mails” to communicate with
debtors.95 Thus, including the debtor’s address or other stamps and
affixing language or symbols by the United States Post Service (“USPS”)
to ensure successful delivery are both sanctioned.96
Next, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion
that §1692f and §1692f(8) read together yield ambiguity.97 The court
plainly reasoned nothing in the prefatory language of §1692f renders
§1692f(8) ambiguous.98 It explained the prefatory language prohibits
“unfair and unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect debt”
and is followed by eight discrete violations determined by each
subsection’s language.99 The court ruled any other language, except what
is prescribed, constitutes a violation, and §1692f(8) draws a bright line
“to ensure consumers' rights are not lost in the interpretation of more
subtle language.”100
Therefore, determining violations of §1692f(8) is simple for the
Seventh Circuit: a debt collector may not use any language or symbol on
the envelope, except for its business name or address, so long as the name
does not indicate it is in the debt collection business.101
III. DISCUSSION
Although the Seventh Circuit’s decision to prohibit any language—
save the two permissible exceptions—on an envelope delivered to a
consumer to avoid violating §1692f(8) was legally sound, the court
should have strengthened its decision by relying on another provision of
occurring because of a literal reading of § 1692f(8) and finding language like “overnight mail” and
“forwarding address correction requested” provided by the United States Postal Service would be
permissible).
95. Id.
96. See id. (reasoning these language and symbols are required for sending communication
through the mail).
97. See id. at n.4. (providing additional dissatisfaction with the previous district court cases used
by the Firth Circuit in Goswami. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Masuda court never even
considered if §1692f(8) was ambiguous in the first place, which would warrant the use of legislative
history).
98. Id. at 782.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 783-84. The court’s main concerned was a benign language exception will lead to the
abusive debt collection practices § 1692f(8) was specifically drafted to prevent. Supporting its conclusion,
the court then cites to Palmer v. Credit Collection Servs., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 819 (E.D. Pa. 2015). In
Palmer, the court provided that a bright line provides “certainty to debt collectors and avoids the problem
of having to decide on a case by case basis what language or symbols intrude into the privacy of the debtor
or otherwise constitute ‘an unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.’
Congress wrote into the law a bright-line rule with respect to markings on envelopes sent to debtors and
authorized the award of damages to debtors if debt collectors violate the plain language of § 1692f(8).”
160 F. Supp. 3d at 822-23.
101. See Preston, 948 F.3d at 784.
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the FDCPA—§1692b(5).
Section A of this Part argues that the Seventh Circuit interpreted
§1692f(8) correctly. Section B argues the Fifth and Eighth Circuit’s
holding was misplaced because it attempted to find textual ambiguity
when there is none. Section C of this Part explains that the Seventh Circuit
could have used another provision of the FDCPA to strengthen its
holding. Because the FDCPA applies to consumers, debt collectors, and
several other related parties in the collection of debt, 102 Congress likely
intended the FDCPA to be read in whole, and if there is similar text in
various sections, those sections should be read with the same statutory
interpretation. Section D of this Part explores how the time difference
between the circuit decisions may have impacted the outcome. Section E
argues the Seventh Circuit’s analysis provides debt collectors an
opportunity to leave language on envelopes delivered to debtors. Finally,
Section F of this Part suggests an amendment to §1692f(8), which would
allow additional language on envelopes in accord with the Seventh
Circuit’s holding.
A. The Seventh Circuit simply read what is written
1. Applying the text as written
The Seventh Circuit was correct in holding that when communicating
with consumers through the mails, debt collectors cannot use any
language or symbol on envelopes except their business addresses and
names.103 Section 1692f(8) clearly indicates that using any language or
symbol other than the business address and name is a violation of
§1692f.104 Although the prefatory language of §1692f is likely broad
enough to encompass any unfair or unconscionable debt collecting
practice, the next eight subsections provide a list of explicit examples
constituting violations.105 Thus, there is no need for courts to search for
ambiguity or absurdity in the text of §1692f(8)—the plain language is
unequivocal. Because there are no additional caveats or exceptions to
§1692f(8),106 debt collectors cannot reasonably believe any other
language on envelopes would be permissible.
While the debt collector in Preston argued §1692f(8) would result in
envelopes without a consumer’s address, because the consumer’s address
102. See § 1692a (providing definitions for the FDCPA).
103. Preston, 948 F.3d at 784.
104. See § 1692f(8).
105. Id. § 1692f.
106. Debt collectors can use their business name if their name does not indicate they are in the
debt-collecting business. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 7

2022]

BENIGN LANGUAGE

983

is not permitted language in the statute, the debt collector’s position is
untenable. As the court noted, any person seeking to make “use of the
mails” must have a delivery address if the envelope is to be successfully
delivered.107 Even if any other language was allowed on envelopes,
Congress would have included the additional permissible language in the
provision, as opposed to courts creating judicial exceptions.108 However,
Congress did not include additional language in the statute; therefore, any
language beside the consumer’s address or the debt collector’s address
and business name violates §1692f(8).
2. Support from the Sixth Circuit
Recently the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Donovan v. Firstcredit, Inc.
agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that §1692f(8) did not
include a benign language exception.109 The court criticized the Eighth
Circuit’s approach and held §1692f(8) was unambiguous.110 The Sixth
Circuit noted the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning was flawed because the court
ignored the “alternative, available, and reasonable” reading of §1692f(8),
which allows the debt collector to put the consumer’s address on the
envelope.111 The court realized debt collectors must include the
consumer’s address if the letter is to be mailed and delivered, and it
concluded §1692f(8) operates under the presupposition that the envelope
will “employ those features necessary to facilitate it’s delivery.”112 By
contrast, the Sixth Circuit slightly weakens its decision by including the
word “alternative” in its statutory analysis, suggesting there is another
permissible reading of the statute. By providing dicta supporting the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits’ reading that an ambiguity exists because there is
more than one reading of the provision, the Sixth Circuit should have
refrained from using “alternative.” Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit’s
holding supports the purpose of §1692f(8), even more than a benign
language exception, because the literal reading removes claims of
absurdity.113
107. Preston, 948 F.3d at 782.
108. Compare City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304-05 (2013) (noting the Supreme Court
cautions that “’judges ought to refrain from substituting their own interstitial lawmaking’ for that of an
agency” (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568, 100 S. Ct. 790, 63 L. Ed. 2d 22
(1980))), with Congress has given the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau the authority to prescribe
rules with respect to the FDCPA. See § 1692l(d) (2020).
109. 983 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding a literal reading of § 1692f(8) does not provide
ambiguous text or absurd results).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 254-55.
112. Id. at 255.
113. Id. The court then provides three examples of how the literal meaning furthers the purpose of
the FDCPA: (1) serves to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by exempting only language and
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3. The CFPB does not recognize a benign language exception
The CFPB even opined §1692f(8) is unambiguous and without need
for a benign language exception. In its amicus brief, filed after oral
argument, the CFPB succinctly stated there is no “benign language”
exception to §1692f(8).114 As the CFPB has the power to “prescribe rules
with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors, as defined in this
title,” it has adequate and persuasive authority to instruct courts how
FDCPA claims should be adjudicated.115 In Preston, the CFPB116 argued
§1692f(8) expressly permits two pieces of information on envelopes and
expressly recognizes debt collectors can use language and symbols that
facilitate the delivery of mail.117 The CFPB incontrovertibly declared
§1692f(8) affords no benign language exception because the text
explicitly delineates what are acceptable language and symbols.118
In sum, the Seventh Circuit’s decision follows the law as written. Any
use of language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address or
name, unless the name indicates a debt collecting business, violates
§1692f(8).
B. The Fifth and Eighth Circuit read ambiguity into plain language
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits wrongly held a benign language
exception exists under §1692f(8). While all three circuits agree statutory
interpretation begins with a reading of the plain language of the statute,
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have created ambiguity in a provision where
it does not exist. These decisions should make any reader skeptical
because it is unclear where the ambiguity lies in the provision.
1. The Fifth Circuit failed to read the statutory text
“Statutory interpretation, as [the Supreme Court] always say[s], begins
with the text.”119 If the text is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent, the inquiry ceases.120 Thus, courts should “resist
symbols that facilitate mail delivery; (2) prevents debt collectors from being competitively disadvantaged
because of the potential gamesmanship to push the limits on acceptable language and symbols; and (3)
creates a bright-line rule for uniform application across the nation. Id.
114. Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae Supporting Preston at
5, Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., 948 F.3d 772 (2020) (No. 18-3119) [hereinafter CFPB Br.].
115. See § 1692l(d) rules and regulation for administrative enforcement.
116. Preston, 948 F.3d 722, 780 n.19.
117. CFPB Br. 6.
118. Id. at 5, 9-10.
119. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856, 195 L. Ed. 2d 117 (2016) (referencing Hardt v. Reliance
Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251, 130 S. Ct. 2149, 176 L. Ed. 2d 998 (2010)).
120. Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 948 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir 2020) (citing Kingdomware
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reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.”121
The Fifth Circuit, however, failed to follow this canon of construction.
Instead of reading the entire prefatory language of §1692f, the court
glossed over the sentence following the first sentence on unfair and
unconscionable language. The next sentence reads, “[w]ithout limiting
the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a
violation of this section.”122 The second sentence signals to debt
collectors, and to courts, that in addition to unfair and unconscionable
debt collecting practices, the following eight, separate types of conduct
are prohibited as well.123 There are no words or interpretations of the
second sentence supporting the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that when read
jointly, the prefatory language of §1692f and §1692f(8) produced
ambiguity. The first sentence unequivocally proclaims unfair or
unconscionable efforts to collect debts are prohibited. It does not confuse
the second sentence, but rather codifies that all unfair or unconscionable
practices are prohibitive and controls the second sentence which provides
discrete examples of prohibited conduct.
Moreover, the court even concedes when §1692f(8) is read in isolation,
it is “reasonable to understand it as barring any markings on the outside
of a debt collection letter envelope other than the names and addresses of
the parties.”124 This statement should have been the end of the court’s
inquiry. By its own words, the court correctly interpreted §1692f(8) and
understood its prohibitory conduct. Therefore, like the Eighth Circuit in
the Donovan opinion, the Fifth Circuit should be similarly criticized for
ignoring the available and reasonable reading of §1692f(8).
2. The Fifth Circuit incorrectly consulted legislative history
When there is no ambiguity, there is no need to consult legislative
history.125 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged this rule and understood
resorting to legislative history was only an option if the language was
unclear.126 The court already reasoned §1692f(8) provided clear
prohibitions for debt collectors; therefore, its use of FTC commentary was
improper. The review of FTC commentary exceeded the legal analysis
because the text did not require consultation. Even if the court wondered
Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976, 195 L. Ed. 2d 334 (2016)).
121. CFPB Br. at 10 (quoting Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009)).
122. 15 U. S. C. § 1692f.
123. See supra text accompanying note 43.
124. Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., 377 F.3d 488, 493 (5th Cir. 2004).
125. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020) (explaining
legislative history is consulted if statutory text is ambiguous and those consultations are to provide clarity
to the ambiguity, not create it).
126. See supra note 72.
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why Congress drafted §1692f(8) as such, the language requires no
ambiguity inquiry because the statutory provision is absolute.127 The court
could have reasoned Congress’s absolute bar of any language or symbol,
without limiting the ability to communicate with consumers, removed the
temptation of debt collectors to force consumers into compliance with
undesirable or embarrassing language stamped across envelopes.128 Even
if the Fifth Circuit had considered Congress’s reasoning and let it guide
the court’s decision, consulting FTC commentary was improper because
§1692f(8) is unambiguous.
3. The Eighth Circuit failed to recognize the similarity between name
and initials
The Eighth Circuit reasoning that “name” produces ambiguity is also
wrong, and thus, should have precluded the court from consulting
legislative history. There was no need for the court to find ambiguity to
determine if a debt collector’s initials were the same as the debt
collector’s “name.” Instead of finding ambiguity in the word “name,” the
court should have referenced a basic dictionary to read and understand the
provision. A name is defined as “a word or words by which a person or
thing is known,” and initial is defined as “the first letter of a word or a
name.”129 Thus, an initial is the first letter of a name by which a person is
known. Had the court referenced a dictionary, the analysis would have
ended because “name” is broad enough to include initials, making the
meaning of the provision clear on its face. Furthermore, §1692f(8) even
provides that a debt collector may use his business name on the envelope.
Hypothetically, if Diversified Collection Services, Inc. went by DCS as
its business name, those initials still would have been acceptable language
pursuant to §1692f(8). Alternatively, even if the Eighth Circuit held
initials were not an acceptable, or synonymous, method to express the
debt collector’s business name, the court should have ruled DCS violated
§1692f(8) because they did not use the prescribed language.130
Consequently, the court would have held using initials violated §1692f(8)
because only the debt collector’s business name is permitted. Therefore,
the court would have avoided legislative history because it would have
127. Elwin Griffith, The Peculiarity of Language in the Debt Collection Process: The Impact of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 673, 725 (Summer 2008) (arguing the Fifth
Circuit did not need to search for ambiguity because the “clear language merely forbids the use of any
language or symbol.”).
128. Id.
129. Name and Initial, The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2004). The definition of “initial” used
above is the second definition.
130. See supra note 75. The debt collector used “D.C.S., Inc.” and not its business name Diversified
Collection Services, Inc. on its envelope to the debtor.
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correctly concluded there is no ambiguity in §1692f(8).
4. The root problem of the ambiguous text
Consulting legislative history is not always improper; however, prior
to consulting legislative history, courts must recognize ambiguous
statutory language. The weak point in the Fifth Circuit’s Goswami
decision originates from the absence of an initial finding of ambiguity.
In a footnote, the Seventh Circuit astutely highlights a major flaw in
the Masuda case.131 During the Seventh Circuit’s unfavorable review of
the three previous cases influencing the Goswami decision, it notes that
the Masuda court never determined if §1692f(8) was ambiguous.132 This
revelation severely weakens all subsequent decisions that directly rely on
Masuda for persuasive authority. If courts intimately espouse that
legislative history can only be consulted if statutory text is ambiguous,
then the initial case concluding the existence of a benign language
exception was incorrectly analyzed because the Masuda court failed to
find ambiguity. Since there was no ambiguity to warrant the consultation
of FTC commentary, the influential value of Masuda is nil. With zero
influential value, both the Johnson and Lindbergh holdings are severely
weakened, and consequently Goswami and Strand as well. Therefore, the
Masuda decision should not have been followed and instead led to several
courts recognizing a benign language exception133 which should have
never existed.134 In sum, finding ambiguity in the statutory text was
unreasonable and could have been entirely avoided.
C. What about Section 1692b(5)?
Limiting the language and symbols on envelopes to avoid disclosing
the debt collector is in the debt collecting business is enforced by another
provision of the FDCPA.135 Section 1692b(5) provides when
communicating with third parties to acquire contact information for
consumers, debt collectors may “not use any language or symbol on any
envelope” that indicate the debt collector is in “the debt collection

131. See Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 948 F.3d 772, n. 21.
132. Id. (providing “[t]he Masuda court never considered, in the first instance, whether the
language of the statute was ambiguous therefore necessitating resort to legislative history”).
133. See supra note 61.
134. See supra note 132.
135. See § 1692b(5) (providing when debt collectors communicate with third parties, they may
“not use any language or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any communication effected by
the mails or telegram that indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the
communication relates to the collection of a debt”).
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business or that communication relates to the collection of a debt.”136
While the recipient of the mail is different, the prohibitions under
§§1692f(8) and 1692b(5) are the same: debt collectors cannot use any
language or symbol on any envelope if it indicates the debt collector is in
the debt collection business. Nevertheless, this is where the Seventh
Circuit should have parsed the language of the two provisions.
The court should have referenced §1695b(5) to support its conclusion
that §1692f(8) unambiguous and cannot have a benign language
exception because the statute is absolute.137 Under §1692b(5), the use of
any language or symbol is prohibited only if it conveys the debt collector
is in the business of collecting debts. Under §1692f(8), the use of any
language or symbol, save what is permitted, is absolutely barred. If
Congress wanted to expand the language of §1692f(8), it would have
expressly included those additional means for debt collectors to
communicate with consumers.138 This differs from §1692b(5) which
allows debt collectors much more freedom when communicating with
individuals. Section 1692b(5) implies debt collectors can include any of
the language utilized by the debt collector defendants in any of the circuit
court cases because none of those words equated to a debt collecting
business. Thus, while both provisions limit the use of any language or
symbols, §1692f(8) creates a bright-line rule, while §1692b(5) allows
creative debt collectors to mark-up envelopes.
Therefore, because Congress did not include an exception or leave
room for an implied exception, it was incorrect for the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits to create one. The Seventh Circuit should have included this
distinction to bolster its legal reasoning and holding. While the court did
reach the correct conclusion, it could have added the distinction to the
opinion and declared “[w]here Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of that same Act, it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”139
D. The Impact of Time between Decisions
Delegating enforcement of the FDCPA to the CFPB likely had an
impact on the Seventh Circuit’s decision. Prior to enacting the CFPB in
136. Id. Note, this provision has also been challenged for ambiguous text, but relating to the phrase
“communication relates to collection of debts,” rather than the “use of any language or symbol” phrase.
See e.g. Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 2011); Scribner v. Works &
Lentz, Inc., 655 Fed. Appx. 702, 706 (10th Cir. 2016); Mahjub v. Rent Recover of Better NOI, LLC, 16
C 6574, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33653, at **9-11(N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2017).
137. See generally CFPB Br. at 11-12.
138. Id. See also Griffith, supra note 127, at 727.
139. CFBP Br. at 12 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
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2010,140 Congress wrote the FTC was the enforcement agency of the
FDCPA.141 While the FTC did not have general rulemaking authority,142
its staff commentary was quite influential for FDCPA litigation.143
However, the FTC cautioned its commentary did not have the “force of a
trade regulation rule or formal agency action” and was “not binding on
the Commission or the public.”144 Therefore, the FTC commentary was
only persuasive authority for the courts.
In 1988, the FTC acknowledged a literal reading of §1692f(8) would
lead to absurd results, and it allowed for debt collectors to add a few words
to envelopes.145 The permissible language included words like
“personal,” “confidential,” and “telegram,” and the FTC explained those
words would not violate §1692f(8).146 Thus, the earlier courts found
support for their decision to allow the allegedly violative language. As
argued above, however, the courts’ consultations on the FTC commentary
were improper because the statutory language was never ambiguous.147
Therefore, the FTC commentary might have allowed a benign language
exception or even permitted the offending language if §1692f(8) was
indeed ambiguous.
The question then becomes if the CFPB was enacted before the
Goswami or Strand decisions, would the CFPB have argued against the
benign language exception? While impossible to know, it seems likely the
CFPB would still take the same position—there is no benign language
exception—but this presumption is not absolute. Had the CFBP been in
existence before 2004, it could have just as easily determined there was a
benign language exception, and it would be up to Congress to amend or
remove that exception.148 This possibility is important because, before
enacting the CFPB, debt collectors could have included language on
envelopes that allegedly violated §1692f(8) if they obtained an advisory

140. See id. at 3 (stating the creation of the CFPB was part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act).
141. See id. at 2-3 (providing the FTC would enforce the FDCPA pursuant to § 1692l(a) (2010)).
142. Id.
143. This reflects the usage of FTC staff commentary for Masuda, Johnson, Lindbergh, Goswami,
Strand and all subsequent cases recognizing a benign language exception.
144. Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097 (Dec.13, 1988).
145. Id. at 50099.
146. Id.
147. The Author acknowledges that FTC commentary allowing certain language to be included on
envelopes indicates there is an argument the § 1692f(8) is ambiguous; however, as argued in this Note,
the provision is no ambiguous because it provides exactly what is and is not allowed on envelops to
consumers.
148. Courts could have determined the existence of a benign language exception, but following the
canons of construction, they could only make this determination after first finding textual ambiguity.
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opinion from the FTC.149 Before its current version, §1692k(e) provided
no liability if debt collectors acted in accordance with an advisory opinion
issued from the then enforcing agency.150 §1692k(e) now grants the CFPB
the power to issue advisory opinions and explains that a debt collector
faces no liability if an advisory opinion is obtained in the debt collector’s
favor or if after such act, the opinion is amended and the judiciary or some
other authority determines the opinion invalid.151 While time likely
influenced each circuit’s decision, debt collectors and consumers would
benefit if Congress amended §1692f(8) and clarified the language.
E. Can both consumers and debt collectors be satisfied?
Either there is zero language or symbols listed on envelopes to
consumers,152 or there is permissible language for successful mail
delivery. The former aligns with the previous argument and overall
holding of the Seventh Circuit, yet the court ultimately allowed language
for successful mail delivery. An argument then surfaces regarding what
constitutes language for successful mail delivery and who may list it on
envelopes.
The Seventh Circuit noted that pre-printed postage or the use of
“overnight mail” was permissible language.153 Additionally, the court
reasoned §1692f(8) did not prohibit markings required by the USPS for
delivery like affixing language or stamps.154 Importantly, the CFPB even
provided “forwarding and address correction requested” as well as a
USPS barcode would be permitted.155 The CFPB also explained other
markings were permissible so long as the markings facilitated using the
mail.156 Does the CFPB take the position “priority mail” or “priority
letter” is permissible as well? Because such language would facilitate the
use of mails, the answer seems to be yes; however, if those markings were
allowed, they would clearly violate §1692f(8).
Although the CFPB argued “forwarding and address correction
requested” was permissible, the Seventh Circuit avoided including that
language in its opinion. The court acknowledged the CFPB’s guidance
149. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 588 130 S.
Ct. 1605 (2010) (explaining Congress included a protection from liability where debt collects conducted
“any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the [FTC].” §1692k(e)).
150. See 15 U. S. C. § 1692k(e) (2010).
151. See generally 15 U. S. C. § 1692k(e) (2020).
152. The exception being a debt collects business name and address if it does not indicate a debt
collection business. See § 1692f(8).
153. Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 948 F.3d, 772, 782 (7th Cir. 2020).
154. Id.
155. CFPB Br. at 13.
156. Id.
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but potentially excluded this language because it was exactly the
offending language in Masuda. If the court explicitly wrote “forwarding
and address correction requested” was permissible, it would have
implicitly accepted the Masuda court’s conclusion that §1692f(8) was not
violated.157 Had the court accepted the reasoning in Masuda, the court
would have weakened its own conclusion that §1692f(8) permits
additional language to ensure successful mail delivery. Nonetheless, the
court must know “forwarding and address correction requested” is
permissible language because obtaining the correct address is necessary
for successful mail delivery. Thus, it appears the Seventh Circuit’s
disagreement with Goswami and Strand is not over whether an exception
exists but rather the poor word choice, “benign language exception,” for
describing permissible language as opposed to “[ensuring] the successful
delivery of the communication.”158
In sum, the language of §1692f(8) is absolute. It seems peculiar both
the Seventh Circuit and CFPB allow for exceptions—although they both
phrase it as permissible language—to §1692f(8). The court should have
ruled if the affixing language, stamp, or shipping speed is on a letter to
consumers, it must be marked by USPS itself and not the debt collector.
To allow the debt collector to include other language on envelopes would
violate §1692f(8). The permissible language should only be marked by
USPS because USPS, not debt collectors, delivers mail. The only problem
becomes: what happens if debt collectors themselves include the affixing
language, stamp, or shipping speed?159 According to USPS guidelines,
individuals can write “priority mail” on their own envelopes.160
Nonetheless, given the court’s holding, debt collectors should probably
have USPS stamp or affix language to their envelopes to avoid any
potential violation, even if debt collectors themselves seek to facilitate the
delivery of their mail.
F. Suggestion for amending 15 U.S.C. §1692f(8)
To ensure debt collectors no longer face potential litigation over
§1692f(8) violations, Congress should consider the below amendment to
the statute:
157. The Masuda court found no violation of § 1692f(8) because of the benign language exception.
158. See Preston, 948 F.3d at 782 (holding § 1692f(8) does not prohibit markings required by the
United States Postal Service such as stamping or affixing language or symbols to ensure the successful
delivery of the communication.”).
159. According to the USPS, if individuals use their own boxes or envelopes for priority mail, they
must identify it with the marking of “Priority Mail.” USPS, Postal Explore,
https://pe.usps.com/BusinessMail101/Index (follow “Classes of Mail” hyperlink; then follow “Priority
Mail” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 16, 2021).
160. Id.
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Using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on
any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or
by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such
name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.
Notwithstanding any permitted language or symbol, additional language or
symbol shall not violate this subsection if the language or symbol used on
any envelope is printed by the United States Postal Service for the delivery
of envelopes listed in the Mail Classification Schedule and identified as
market dominant products.

This amendment allows debt collectors to have USPS envelopes already
affixed with additional language.161 By granting debt collectors the ability
to use USPS envelopes with “priority” or other pre-printed language on
envelopes, debt collectors would not be violating the statute or the
Seventh Circuit’s holding because the language on the letter would be for
the successful delivery of the mail.
The amendment can be implemented because the USPS already has
authority to “provide and sell postage stamps and other stamped paper,
cards, and envelopes.”162 Debt collectors could simply consult the Mail
Classification Schedule, as kept by the Postal Regulatory Commission,163
and consult the part for market dominant products to explore which
services and affixing language can be customized on the envelopes.164
Within the market dominant products, debt collectors could select from
various special services for their envelopes, such as address correction
services, business reply mail, certified mail, and stamped envelopes. 165
Also, debt collectors can obtain personalized stamped envelopes with
first-class mail postage.166 Furthermore, debt collectors can consult the
Domestic Mail Manual for specifications on all services provided, how
language would look on envelopes, and other mail-related inquiries.167
Overall, this feasible solution allows additional language on envelopes
without violating the amended §1692f(8). Under the proposed
amendment, so long as debt collectors do not frustrate a core reason for
passing the FDCPA,168 they could obtain statutorily permitted envelopes
with additional language, and courts would not have to be split over a
161. The Author’s suggestion is limited to USPS, but § 1692f(8) could be amended to include other
shippers like FedEx or UPS.
162. See generally 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(4).
163. 39 C.F.R. § 3040.104(a).
164. See id. at § 3040.104(b)(2) (detailing the information concerning market dominate products).
165. POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION, MAIL CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE, 121 (revised through
March 31, 2021).
166. See id. at 150.
167. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, POSTAL EXPLORER: DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL (2021),
https://pe.usps.com/DMM300 (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
168. See generally § 1692(a) (providing Congressional findings on the implications of abusive
practices in debt collecting practices, namely invading individual privacy).
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“benign language exception” or language ensuring the “successful
delivery of the communication.”
IV. CONCLUSION
Ensuring compliance with §1692f(8) is straightforward. Debt
collectors cannot include any language or symbol on envelopes when
communicating with consumers, except the debt collector’s address and
business name if the name does not indicate a debt collection business.
Furthermore, debt collectors cannot use language such as transmittal,
personal, confidential, or immediate reply requested because there is no
benign language exception. There is no exception because §1692f(8) is
unambiguous in its construction, and the Fifth and Eighth Circuits were
incorrect in finding ambiguity in the text. Both circuits should have
reached the same conclusion as the Seventh Circuit and held there is no
benign language exception to §1692f(8). Additionally, if any language or
symbol is to be included on the envelope, it will not violate §1692f(8) if
it ensures the successful delivery of the communication. Nonetheless, if
there was an exception, Congress would have written it into the statute to
provide guidance on how debt collectors can guarantee they are not
violating any unfair or unconscionable debt collecting practice.
Future courts faced with debt collectors claiming a benign language
exception should follow the Seventh Circuit’s approach and also
recommend that Congress amend the statute. Congress should clarify the
provision to enable the USPS to provide language and symbols on
envelopes for debt collectors, so those can be affixed to envelopes and not
violate the provision. Under this Comment’s proposed amendment, debt
collectors could more easily comply with §1692f(8), and consumers
would still avoid any abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt collection
practices. The proposed amendment does not restrict the FDCPA’s efforts
to protect consumers but rather simply guarantees that important mail is
delivered legally.
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